Abstract. A theory is developed to explain all possible three alternative (single profile) pairwise and positional voting outcomes. This includes all preference aggregation paradoxes, cycles, conflict between the Borda and Condorcet winners, differences among positional outcomes (e.g., the plurality and antiplurality methods) and among procedures using these outcomes (e.g., runoffs, Kemeny's rule, and Copeland's method). It is shown how to identify, interpret, and construct all profiles supporting each paradox. Among new conclusions, it is shown why a standard for the field, the Condorcet winner, is seriously flawed.
Introduction
Over the last two centuries considerable attention has focussed on the properties of positional voting procedures. These are the commonly used approaches where points are assigned to alternatives according to how each voter positions them. The standard plurality method, for instance, assigns one point to a voter's top-ranked candidate and zero to all others while the Borda Count (BC) assigns n − 1, n − 2, . . . , n − n = 0 points, respectively, to a voter's first, second, . . . , nth ranked candidate. While the significance of these procedures derives from their wide usage, much of their appeal comes from their mysterious paradoxes (i.e., counterintuitive conclusions) demonstrating highly complex outcomes. By introducing doubt about the meaning of election outcomes, these paradoxes raise the legitimate concern that, inadvertently, we can choose badly even in sincere elections.
These methods serve as prototypes for aggregation procedures, so they identify potential issues for economics and other areas. This is illustrated by the connection between the manipulation of decision procedures and the subsequent incentive literature. Another example is the connection between voting paradoxes (Saari [20] ) and an extension of the Sonnenschein [38, 39] , Mantel [12] , Debreu [7] aggregate excess demand result for the single set of n commodities to the general setting of all subsets with two or more commodities (Saari [21, 22] ). Also, connections between positional and statistical methods have provided new results for nonparametric statistics (Haunsperger [8] ).
Positional outcomes also are used with choice procedures. A runoff, for instance, is held among the top-ranked candidates from a first election. An agenda, a tournament, the Copeland Method ( [6, 31, 14] ), and Kemeny's rule ( [10, 11, 32] ) are among the many procedures using pairwise voting outcomes. Other methods, such as the controversial approval voting and the enigmatic rules of figure skating, use positional outcomes in complicated ways.
Complexity of analysis. Positional procedures have proved to be formidable to analyze.
The underlying complexity is indicated by the radical manner in which societal outcomes can change when alternatives are added or dropped. The severe difficulty is further manifested by how different postional procedures can generate over 84 million different election rankings with a single ten-candidate profile (Saari [25] ). Once the ballots are marked, the voters' opinions remain fixed, but by varying the choice of positional methods we obtain millions of contradictory outcomes where each alternative wins with some procedures but is bottom-ranked with others. Not all of these conflicting outcomes accurately reflect the voters' opinions, so which is the correct one? Of more importance, what causes these varied outcomes?
A natural reaction to this complexity is a resigned attitude captured by Riker's assertion [19] that " [t] he choice of a positional voting method is subjective." Related comments come from another expert who stressed the importance of social choice -which considers only the election winnerover a social ordering. He argues that " [g] iven all the logical barriers that have to be scaled to even come close to making a coherent social choice, demanding a full ordering is a tall order." Indeed, trying to find a full ordering is "something that most of us long ago gave up on as impossible and/or incoherent." His thoughts probably reflect the general sense of the choice community.
In response to these difficulties, a natural goal is to characterize all possible paradoxes that occur with any single profile. This has been done (for any number of candidates) where the results (see Saari [20, 26] and the references) prove that positional procedures admit significantly more kinds of problems and complexities than previously suspected. So, the next step is to explain these paradoxes and to construct all possible illustrating profiles. This project now is completed; the three-candidate results, with geometric representations, are reported here. The more abstract case of n ≥ 4 alternatives is in (Saari [30] ). Fortunately, but unexpected, the answers for these challenges are surprisingly natural and simple with the following profile decomposition.
Profile decomposition.
To simplify the analysis while addressing the complexities, an approach is introduced which emphasizes the structure of profile space. (A profile lists each voter's ranking of the alternatives.) Namely, the six-dimensional profile space is decomposed into orthogonal subspaces where profiles from each subspace affect only certain procedures.
An ideal starting point for a decomposition is with profiles which achieve a major objective of choice theory -they admit no conflict. Surprisingly, this profile subspace exists (but, it does not include unanimity profiles). To underscore their central role, I call them Basic profiles. As shown, the rankings and the (normalized) tallies of all positional methods and pairwise outcomes agree with a Basic profile. This (two-dimensional) profile subspace, then, allows no conflict or problems among procedures and their derived methods. Basic profiles liberate us from the above difficulties where election outcomes change with the choice of the procedures or as candidates leave or enter.
Because nothing goes wrong on this space, all election difficulties and conflicts which have driven, motivated, but frustrated this research area are caused by profiles orthogonal to the Basic profile subspace. (As indicated in Sect. 6.4, this includes axiomatic mysteries such as Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [1] .) The (one-dimensional) Condorcet space, has all profiles which cause pairwise voting paradoxes but have no affect on positional methods. Profiles in the (two-dimensional) Reversal subspace create all differences in positional methods, but they have no affect on pairwise rankings. The last one-dimensional subspace, the Kernel, are the profiles with a completely tied pairwise and positional election outcomes.
This description already suggests how to use the decomposition. For instance, to create a profile where the plurality outcome differs from the pairwise outcomes, start with a Basic profile defining the common A B C for all pairwise and positional rankings. Then, add a Reversal profile to change the plurality ranking to C B A. (As shown, this is easy to do.) As Reversal profiles do not affect pairwise rankings, we have a desired example. To alter the pairwise outcomes in a specified manner, add an appropriate Condorcet component to the profile. In this elementary manner, we extend the (Saari [20, 26] ) results characterizing all election paradoxes to identify all supporting profiles for each paradox. As such, this decomposition resolves a long-standing goal of classical choice theory.
Conversely, by decomposing a specified profile into its component parts (Sect. 8), we can determine its effect on various election methods. To illustrate how this adds to our understanding, I use it to describe new problems with Black's single-peakedness condition (Sect. 8.4) , to find different interpretations for historically important examples (Sects. 8. 1, 8.2) , and to explain a conjecture about strategic voting. (Sect. 8.5) .
Once the profiles supporting each election outcome are identified, we find new explanations for the paradoxes by analyzing how profiles from a subspace affect certain procedures. A surprise is that certain combinations weaken basic axioms such as individual rationality. Clearly, a weakening of basic assumptions explains the paradox. Moreover, it appears that voters' votes should cancel on these subspaces to cause a complete tie, so they should not contribute toward the societal outcome. But they do with certain procedures, and this causes all voting paradoxes.
The properties and peculiarities of derivative methods (e.g., runoffs, approval voting, figure skating, etc.) also can be derived from this profile division. This is because, by knowing how each component of a procedure reacts to the different profile subspaces, we obtain a new understanding of the method. To see what else is possible, because axiomatic representations identify properties unique to a particular procedure, by knowing how a procedure uses and reacts to the different profile subspaces leads to new axiomatic characterizations and new proofs for known ones. Similarly, strategic behavior (and related topics such as monotonicity) involve changes in profiles. By knowing how procedures react to profiles from each subspace, we obtain new insights into the manipulability of methods. Thus, the susceptibility of procedures can be compared deeply than, say, with a measure theoretic approach (Saari [24] ). (Because of the importance of these topics, a lengthy analysis is offered elsewhere.) Similarly, answers to historical and contemporary concerns from social choice can be found. This includes the Borda and Condorcet debates of the 1780s which inaugurated the field of social choice.
Borda-Condorcet debates.
For a flavor of the kinds of results which follow from the decomposition, I preview the Sect. 6.3 conclusions about the Borda-Condorcet debate; a debate which introduced and still shapes social choice. The academic study of voting started in 1770 (e.g., see the books by McLean and coauthors [15, 16] ) when Borda [4] constructed a profile (Sect. 8.2) casting doubt on the wisdom of using the plurality vote. He showed how the BC avoids this difficulty -at least for his profile. In 1785, Condorcet [5] introduced a competing method; his Condorcet Winner is the alternative who wins all pairwise elections. Arrow [1] , 165 years later, developed his "binary independence" condition and impossibility theorem which significantly extend Condorcet's notions.
With its natural, intuitive appeal, it is understandable why Condorcet's method is an accepted standard for choice theory. Condorcet distinguished his approach with a profile (Sect. 8.1) where all positional methods fail to elect the Condorcet winner. Thus a Condorcet winner need not be the BC winner, and this continues to be cited as a fatal BC flaw. But by examining these historically important examples with the profile decomposition, the surprise is that for any conflict between the BC and Condorcet rankings, all examples support Borda's approach while raising serious doubts about Condorcet's method -the standard of the field. The conflict resides in the failings of the pairwise vote -not the BC. This conclusion contradicts what has been accepted for two centuries, and Condorcet's example helps to reverse Condorcet's intended message.
The explanation is that the BC ignores the Condorcet components which affect only pairwise outcomes. This is important because, as shown, the combination of the pairwise vote with the Condorcet terms weakens the crucial assumption that voters have transitive preferences. The same phenomenon explains Arrow's impossibility theorem; by relying upon the Condorcet terms, Arrow's binary independence condition unexpectedly devalues his individual rationality assumption. (See Sect. 6.4 and Saari [28] .) An equally surprising assertion is that rather than being the standard, the Condorcet winner must be held in suspect.
1.4. Removing paradoxes. So, inconsistencies in election tallies result from profiles orthogonal to the Basic profiles. But as the Basic profiles define only a two-dimensional subspace, these inconsistencies are nearly omnipresent. Indeed (by dimension counting), it is more likely to have a completely tied plurality election (a three-dimensional space of profiles) than to avoid election tallies with inconsistencies.
Other than with profile restrictions, an alternative way to eliminate the affects of the orthogonal profiles is to use a profile's Basic component where all disagreement and conflict disappear because all procedures agree. In turn, this underscores an important conclusion of this paper; the BC is the only positional procedure which ignores all orthogonal components. But as the BC tally of the original profile is what other procedures obtain only after removing all effects of the other profile components, it follows that using the BC with the original profile is an efficient, pragmatic way to obtain the common Basic outcome. 
Notation and division of procedures

Terminology and voting vectors.
A profile specifies the number of voters of each type. Using the labeling of Table 2 .1, the integer profile (0, 5, 0, 3, 4, 0) has five voters of type-two (A
C B), three of type-four (C B A), and four of type-five (B C A).
A three-candidate positional election is defined by voting vector w 3 s = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ) = (1, s, 0) where s, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, is a specified value. In tallying a ballot, w j points are assigned to the voter's jth ranked alternative, j = 1, 2, 3; e.g., the plurality (i.e., My normalization of voting vectors requires the top-ranked alternative to receive one point. Thus the BC, given by B 3 = (2, 1, 0), has the normalized form b 3 = 1 2 B 3 = (1, 1 2 , 0). Similarly, an election tallied by assigning six, five, and zero points, respectively, to a voter's top, second, and bottom ranked candidate has the normalized form ( 6 6 , 5 6 , 0). An important relationship (probably due to Borda and known by Nanson [17] ) between the pairwise and the BC tallies can be described by computing how a voter with preferences A B C votes in pairwise elections. 2 Neutrality is where interchanging the names of the candidates similarly interchanges the election tallies.
The three-candidate division of voting vectors is simple. It consists of the (1, 0) methods used to tally pairwise elections which, as described above, define the b 3 tally. All remaining w 3 s methods are represented as a sum of b 3 and the derived vector d 3 = (0, 1, 0). 3
Theorem 1. All three candidate voting vectors can be expressed as
Proof. This is a simple algebraic relationship Let F (p, w 3 s ) be the w 3 s election tally for profile p. To motivate the use of the linearity of F in the w 3 s variable, suppose the B 3 = (2, 1, 0) tally of an election is (20, 40, 30) and the plurality tally is (9, 8, 13) . Because (7, 2, 0) = 2B 3 + 3(1, 0, 0), the 2 and 3 multiples require the voters' (7, 2, 0) tally to be 2 (20, 40, 30 
The line of election outcomes defined by Eq. 2.4 is called the procedure line (Saari, [23, 24] ).
Geometry.
For a geometric representation of rankings and profiles, assign each candidate a vertex of an equilateral triangle (Saari [23, 24] ). The ordinal ranking of a point in the triangle comes from its distances to the vertices where "closer is better." Points equidistant between two vertices represent indifference. In this manner, the "representation triangle" is divided into "ranking regions." (The numbers in the left triangle of Fig. 1 identify the region's Eq. 2.1 voter type.) Represent a profile by placing the number of voters of each type in its ranking region as illustrated on the right in Fig. 1 . The representation triangle geometry simplifies computing plurality, BC, pairwise, d 3 , and (with Eq. 2.4) w 3 s tallies. To tally pairwise elections notice that the central vertical line is equidistant between the A and B vertices; it is the A ∼ B indifference line. Thus, the {A, B} pairwise tallies are the sums of profile entries on each side of the line; e.g., in the left triangle of Fig. 1, B' s tally is the sum of the entries in the darker shaded region. With the Fig. 1 [39]
[42]
Fig. 1 Representation triangle
A candidate's BC tally is the sum of her pairwise tallies, so the b 3 vector tally (58, 64, 49) defines the BC ranking B A C which conflicts with the pairwise rankings as A, the Condorcet winner, is not BC top-ranked. A candidate's plurality tally is the number of voters who have her topranked, so it is the sum of the profile entries in the two ranking regions sharing the candidate's vertex. In the left triangle of Fig. 1 
Profile decomposition
To quickly analyze a three-candidate profile, I recommend the approach in (Saari [24] ). But as this approach is an approximate way to analyze voting procedures, it cannot address certain issues. The following provides an accurate analysis for all profiles.
3.1. Profile differential. Because my approach involves adding profiles, the analysis is simplified by using profile differentials -the difference between two profiles with the same number of voters -rather than profiles.
Definition 1. A profile differential is the difference between two profiles involving the same number of voters. Equivalently, a listing of the number of voters of each type is a profile differential if and only if the sum of the entries is zero.
Profile differentials define the basis for various subspaces of profiles. To simplify the use, for two subspaces I specify three choices even though any two suffice. As a profile differential involves negative numbers of voters, they are converted into an "actual" profile (with a non-negative number of voters of each type) by adding a "neutral" profile. To illustrate with profile differential p d = (1, 0, −2, 0, 1, 0), by adding (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2) (a profile forcing completely tied elections) we obtain the profile (3, 2, 0, 2, 3, 2).
3.2. Decomposition. The profile decomposition has four components. The Kernel has no effect on any procedure. The Basic portion is where all procedures agree. The Condorcet portion affects only pairwise votes; e.g., it explains cycles, all differences between the pairwise and BC outcomes, etc. The Reversal portion causes all differences in positional outcomes. 
The symmetry of these differentials (how they were discovered) is apparent from Fig. 2 
The 
Proof. An elementary computation proves the subspaces are mutally orthogonal. The K asserion is obvious. Using the geometric approach with To make B (the BC bottom ranked candidate) the plurality winner, add p R = 3R B to obtain (−7, 4, 5, −5, 2, 1). As the 3R B term adds (−3, 6, −3) to the Basic profile outcome (Eq. 3.5) to find the plurality tally, B is the plurality winner but (part 4) the BC and pairwise rankings remain untouched. To generate conflicting pairwise rankings, notice how the Condorcet portion introduces a cyclic effect (part 3) without changing positional rankings. So, adding p C = −2C 3 creates a cyclic effect helping B over A and A over C; the resulting p B + p R + p C = (−9, 6, 3, −3, 0, 3) requires the previously middle-ranked A to tie each candidate in pairwise elections. The profile differential has a −9 term, so convert it into a profile by adding p K = 9K to obtain (0, 15, 12, 6, 9, 12) . By construction, this profile has
• the BC outcome C A B,
• the plurality outcome B C A, and • the pairwise outcome A ∼ B, A ∼ C, C B which, while not transitive, is not cyclic.
3.4. Choice of coefficients. The non-negative coefficients used in this example simplify the analysis. This choice of coefficients always is possible. An alternative choice, which I often use, requires the coefficient for candidate C to be zero with no sign restrictions on the remaining two coefficients. 
Corollary 1. The Basic and Reversal vectors satisfy
B A + B B + B C = R A + R B + R C = 0.(3.
Geometry of pairwise voting
Theorem 3 identifies the Basic and Condorcet vectors, p B + p C , as the only profile portions which affect pairwise rankings. Consequently, all BC and pairwise differences, all properties of the Condorcet winner, agendas, cycles, etc. are completely and quickly determined by these differentials. Tools to assist this analysis are developed next. Combined with the Sect. 7 discussion which exploits the Thm. 3 assertion that only the p B +p R portion of a profile effects positional rankings, we create a straight-forward way to understand why different procedures have different societal rankings and what they are.
The large pairwise voting literature (e.g., see Austen-Smith & Banks [2] , Kelly [9] , McKelvey [13] , Richards [18] , Sen [36] , Zwicker [42] , etc.) considers cycles, properties of the Condorcet winner and loser, properties of procedures based on pairwise election outcomes, the Borda -Condorcet conflict, etc. Theorem 3 provides an easy way to find stronger results. Indeed, as all properties of the pairwise rankings and tallies are strictly due to the Basic and Condorcet profile differentials, only these portions need be considered. This analysis is further simplified with the following geometric description.
4.1. Additive transitivity. An important property of the Basic profiles is that their pairwise election rankings go beyond defining ordinal transitive rankings to have the tallies satisfy a highly idealized additive transitivity 4 property. As asserted next, the tallies mimic the additive properties of points x, y, z on the line where (x − y) + (y − z) = (x − z).
Corollary 2. The pairwise rankings of a Basic profile are transitive, and the tallies from any two pairwise elections uniquely determine the tally for the remaining pairwise election. More specifically, if τ B (X, Y ) denotes the difference between X's and Y 's Basic pairwise tallies, then for candidates
.1 captures what a novice might believe about voting. Such a naive individual might expect the election rankings A B and B C to imply that A C, or that A has a larger victory tally over C than over B. These assertions are false in general because we cannot even ensure ordinal transitivity. This idealized setting, however, holds for Basic profiles because the τ B (A, B) and τ B (B, C) sum equals the τ B (A, C) difference.
So, going beyond ensuring transitive pairwise rankings, the point totals for Basic profiles capture the intuitive sense that a wider point spread -even for just one pairwise election -signals a stronger candidate. But as non-transitive results occur and as Cor. 2 proves that such behavior cannot be attributed to the Basic profile, it follows from Thm. 3 that all blame for the failure of transitivity is completely due to the Condorcet portion of a profile. The Basic profile tallies satisfy additive transitivity (Eq. 4.1); the Condorcet portion disrupts both additive and ordinal transitivity.
Geometry and the transitivity plane.
To geometrically compare the Basic and Condorcet differentials, I use the representation cube introduced in (Saari [23, 24] ). Here the difference between pairwise tallies (not just the Basic terms) τ (X, Y ) is replaced with a fraction. Namely, with v voters, let
which requires
For instance, the three choices of x A,B = 1, 0, −1 mean, respectively, that A wins all votes, is tied, and does not receive a single vote when compared with B. Election outcomes are represented by the convex sum of the unanimity vertices. Namely, if p j is the fraction of all voters with the jth preference, and E j is the unanimity vertex with this ranking, then the election outcome is
Because election outcomes are given by this convex sum, they are in the convex hull of the six unanimity vertices; this is the representation cube. This representation cube, depicted by the shaded region in Fig. 3-a, is the set of points in the orthogonal cube satisfying
The importance of the representation cube is that each (rational) point is the pairwise election outcome for some profile. Conversely, each pairwise election outcome defines a rational point in this cube (Saari [23, 24] ). A parallel plane, the transitivity plane, passes through the origin so it is given by
According to Eq. 4.1, this plane, represented in Fig. 3 .b, contains all Basic pairwise outcomes. Perpendicular to the plane is the axis connecting the cyclic rankings of the two vertices ± (1, 1, 1) ; call this the cyclic axis. The C 3 pairwise election outcomes are in this direction. 
where q T is a point in the transitivity plane and µ is a scalar. This is called the transitivity plane coordinate representation.
Proof. A computation proves that the pairwise outcome of a Condorcet term is along the cyclic axis. Another computation proves that the pairwise outcomes for B A and B B are, respectively, (1, 0, −1) and (−1, 1, 0). The span of these two vectors is the transitivity plane.
To prove uniqueness, suppose
where each term is in a different orthogonal subspace. As this requires each term to be zero, uniqueness is proved. The rest of the assertion follows from the decomposition.
Algebra and Thm. 3 connect the geometry with the profile decomposition.
Proposition 2. Profile a
where the first vector is the transitive plane component and the second is the cyclic axis component. Conversely, the representation cube point
, has the profile description
for any λ > 0.
Proof. The verification of Eq. 4.7 follows directly from Thm. 3. Equation 4.8 is obtained by a direct algebraic computation.
Equations 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate important points. First, because a profile differential involves "zero voters," it defines a direction rather than a representation cube point, e.g., this direction is the term in the brackets of Eq. 4.7. To convert the direction into a point, we need the magnitude, . Once we know the number of voters, this direction is converted into a point by using Eq. 4.7. So, when points from the cube are expressed in terms of transitivity plane coordinates, the outcome defines a direction capturing the relative magnitudes of the cyclic and transitive plane coordinates. The actual values, which are complicated by the Reversal terms, are given by Eq. 8.2.
Geometry of Pairwise procedures
The Introduction claims that this approach helps to address the major (and difficult) theme of analyzing and comparing procedures which use pairwise and positional outcomes. I illustrate how to do this, along with identifying other decomposition properties, by comparing procedures dependent upon pairwise election outcomes.
A natural way to compare methods is to characterize and then analyze all profiles where they agree and differ. Because of the complexity of the analysis, however, very few published works attempt to do this. Instead, comparisons are made by constructing illustrating but essentially isolated examples. But the profile decomposition and its associated geometry allow us to realize the more general objective; we can identify all profiles where the outcomes of specified methods differ. For instance, a major mystery is to understand when and why the BC and pairwise rankings differ; I characterize all such profiles.
All procedures agree on the Basic portion of a profile, so all differences are caused by the Condorcet portion. Thus the analysis of cycles, agendas, Kemeny's rule, Copeland's method, the Borda and Condorcet debate, etc., reduce to determining how each procedure treats the Condorcet profiles. In what follows, I emphasize this effect. By combing this information with an interpretation for the Condorcet component (Sect. 6), we obtain new interpretations for differences among procedures.
5.1.
Agendas. An agenda < X, Y, Z > is where the majority winner of the first two candidates, X and Y , is advanced to a majority vote comparison with the last listed candidate Z. As it is known, if the pairwise outcome q is transitive, then the Condorcet winner wins with any agenda; if the rankings are cyclic, the last listed candidate of an agenda, Z, always wins. Thus, when q defines cyclic rankings the outcome depends upon the choice of the agenda. Even stronger, we know (e.g., see [24] ) that the complexities and difficulties associated with agendas 5 are caused by the cyclic pairwise outcomes.
According to the Eq. 4.5 profile decomposition, when q = q T , the pairwise rankings satisfy additive transitivity. Thus, with Basic profiles, agendas are spared these difficulties; e.g., all agendas yield the same outcome. So, the Condorcet portion is totally responsible for all troubles with agendas as well as conflicts with other procedures. (1, 1, 1) , find the BC outcome by separately summing components of q T and of µ (1, 1, 1) , and then adding them together. The µ (1, 1, 1 ) term requires each candidate to win and lose one competition with the same µ difference, so the BC tallies on the cyclic axis cancel. Only the q T term in the transitivity plane affects the BC tally; this component, which comes from the Basic profile term, completely determines the BC outcome. This leads to the following result. 
for scalars α > 0, β.
Proof. As the BC ranking is strictly determined by q T from the Basic profile, the pairwise rankings defined by q T are transitive and agree with the BC ranking (Thm. (A, C) , so the assertion follows by summation and the fact (Thm. 3) that all other profile portions add a fixed amount to each voter's BC tally.
5.2.1. BC sphere. To "see" all differences between the pairwise and BC election outcomes, use the Thm. 4 result that q T is the closest transitivity plane point to q. All points equal distance from q are on a sphere centered at q, so center a sphere at q; call it the BC sphere. Next, treat this sphere as a balloon and blow it up (Fig. 4a) 
Proposition 3. All differences between the BC and pairwise rankings are due to the Condorcet portion of a profile; the BC ignores this term while the pairwise rankings rely upon it.
By combining the BC sphere with the tilt of the transitivity plane, it becomes easy to find profiles where the pairwise and BC rankings differ. As illustrated in Fig. 4a , choose q close enough to a x i,j = 0 coordinate plane so that the BC sphere hits the transitivity plane in a different ranking region; to find an associated profile, use Prop. 2. Indeed, we can identify all q's with different pairwise and BC outcomes. As the BC ranking is completely determined by q T , the same BC ranking holds for q T + µ (1, 1, 1) for all µ values. Therefore, to find all possible q with a specified BC outcome, say A B C, trace a line parallel to (1, 1, 1) along the boundary of the A B C ranking region in the transitivity plane. (See Fig. 3b .) These lines define a boundary surface for the desired pairwise outcomes as given by the dashed lines in Fig. 4b. (The shaded area depicts all q's with a A B C BC outcome.)
Another way to find this geometry is to to cut the representation cube into six pieces according to the template provided by Fig. 3b . Each ranking region of the transitivity plane is defined by the dotted boundaries in Fig. 3b ; so cut the representation cube where the slices are perpendicular to the transitivity plane and pass through these dotted boundaries. This defines the six wedgesone for each strict ranking -depicted by the dashed line boundaries in Fig. 4b . Because the origin of the representation cube, 0 = (0, 0, 0), is on the boundary of all regions, so are the two cyclic vertices ± (1, 1, 1) . This geometry identifies all profiles that exhibit a variety of behaviors including where the BC does not elect the Condorcet winner. For instance, according to Fig. 4b , all q's with transitive rankings which allow a A C B BC outcome are in a type 1, 2, or 3 pairwise ranking region; the commonality of these three rankings is that A is strictly ranked above B. This (and neutrality) provides a geometric proof of the known fact that the BC ranks the Condorcet winner above the Condorcet loser; e.g., the Condorcet winner cannot be BC bottom ranked.
Theorem 5. the set of pairwise outcomes defining a A B C BC outcome is given by the convex hull of the vertices
Proof. This follows directly from the geometry.
5.2.2.
Profile conditions. I am unaware of necessary and sufficient conditions for profiles which describe when the Condorcet winner is not BC top-ranked, or when the BC and pairwise rankings differ, etc. so they are now provided. Assume the BC ranking is A B C which occurs (Thm. 2(a B − b B ) has the smaller value, the relevant γ values are given by Eq. 5.4. In the same way, all results specified in Thm. 6 are found.
Theorem 6. Assume the BC ranking is A B C ranking (so a B > b B > 0). A necessary and sufficient condition for the BC and pairwise rankings to agree is that the coefficient of the Condorcet term γC 3 satisfies
(5.4) (a B − b B ) ) (5.5)
A necessary and sufficient condition for the BC ranking to differ from a transitive pairwise ranking is
−2Max((b B , (a B − b B )) ≤ γ ≤ −2Min(b B ,
A necessary and sufficient condition for the BC ranking have a a candidate other than the BC winner as the Condorcet winner (B) is that
(5.6)
A necessary and sufficient condition for the BC loser not to be the Condorcet loser is
− 2(a B − b B ) < γ < −2b B (5.7)
A necessary and sufficient condition that the BC ranking is accompanied by a pairwise cycle is that γ satisfies one of the inequalities
The first inequality defines the cycle with A B; the second defines the cycle with B A. 6 It is instructive to translate these conditions into the transitive plane geometry of the representation cube. In this manner we discover, for instance, how the tilt of the transitivity plane mandates negative µ and γ values to make B the Condorcet winner. (According to Fig. 4b 6 While revising this paper, Zwicker called my attention to his paper [42] . His major result extends Sen's [36] conditions to avoid cycles. As such, it related to Eq. 5.8 as it identifies when cycles occur but not in the Eq. 5.8 terms of other rankings, etc. Following the lead of Condorcet, Sen, and other researchers who recognized the role of the Condorcet term, he found his result by factoring the profiles giving binary outcomes by the Condorcet profile. As we now know, this necessarily creates Basic and Condorcet directions. His emphasis was on cycles, so he did not develop these constructs in the other ways described here; e.g., how they affect positional procedures, how the Condorcet term weakens assumptions of individual rationality, how and why different rankings occur, etc.
Simplifying a Condorcet result.
In Sect. 1.3, I mention Condorcet's assertion that there exist profiles where no positional method elects the Condorcet winner. The complexity of creating profiles, however, severely limited finding illustrating examples. Also, it was not known why this phenomenon occurs. But as the profile decomposition allows us to create examples illustrating any admissible behavior, we can design many supporting profiles. One approach combines Thm. 6 with Thm. 3. 
5.2.4.
Tallies. Since Borda, we have known relationships between the BC and pairwise rankings, but the reasons for the conclusions have not been well understood. The earlier results use the Eq. 2.2 condition that a candidate's BC tally is the sum of her pairwise tallies. As we now know from Thm. 3, this summation cancels the tallies from the Condorcet portion of the profile leaving only the Basic profile terms to influence the BC outcome. By using this observation, we obtain extensions and new proofs of known statements.
Theorem 7.
Assume there are n = 3 candidates. Proof. The proof of part 1 follows from Thm. 3. Because the first part of part 2 requires the pairwise tallies to satisfy additive transitivity, the profile has no Condorcet portion. (The point is in the transitive plane.) Thus each pairwise outcome for the Basic profile is zero, so, according to Thm. 3, the BC ranking also is a tie. Conversely, a BC complete tie requires a zero Basic portion for the profile. Consequently, as the pairwise vote is strictly determined by the Condorcet portion, the outcome is cyclic. To prove part 3, notice that a Condorcet winner and/or Condorcet loser requires (from part 1) a nonzero Basic portion. On the Basic portion, the pairwise and BC rankings agree, and the pairwise tallies satisfy the additive transitivity condition Eq. 4.1. The τ (X, Y ) outcomes are
For any profile, there exists a unique γ value so that by removing γ points from each of τ (A, B), τ(B, C), τ(C, A),
for any γ. The assertion now follows from simple algebra.
While Thm. 7 part 3 is well known, I know of no statement even speculating whether the converse is true. The reason is clear; to find how a Condorcet winner fares within a BC ranking, we add the pairwise tallies to cancel Condorcet terms. But to prove a statement about how the BC winners or losers fare within the pairwise rankings, we introduce Condorcet terms to the Basic profile. As such, finding relationships requires determining the relationship between the Basic and Condorcet components. As this is done in Fig. 5, the following is a direct consequences of this figure. (The result holds for all n ≥ 3 alternatives.)
Theorem 8. If a profile has a transitive pairwise ranking which is not a complete tie, then it strictly ranks the BC winner above the BC loser.
Proof. The profile for a transitive ranking which is not a complete tie has a non-zero Basic component where the BC winner (or winners as there there may be a tie) ranked above the BC loser (or losers). The rest of the proof follows from Fig. 5 which starts with any Basic rankings and finds all corresponding pairwise rankings. [6] , Saari and Merlin [31] , Merlin and Saari [14] ) often is used to rank sports teams. This is where the winning team receives one point, the losing team −1 and, if there is a tie, both receive zero points. A team's ranking is determined by the sum of received points.
Copeland Method. The Copeland Method (CM) (see Copeland
For a geometric description of CM, replace each non-zero component of (x A,B , x B,C , x C,A ) with the nearest of ±1. With no pairwise ties, this process defines a vertex V CM of the orthogonal cube with the transitivity plane representation
Each candidate's CM score is found from V CM by adding the points she receives in the two elections.
As true with the BC, this summation forces a cancellation in the cyclic direction, so the CM election is determined by the ranking of the transitivity plane coordinate V CM T . Thus the CM outcome also can be described with an expanding balloon but centered at V CM (rather than q). This balloon, or CM sphere, is blown up until it first touches the transitivity plane; this first point of contact V CM T determines the CM ranking. This description proves that the only difference between the CM and BC is the chosen center for the expanding spheres, so all BC and CM differences reflect this translation. Consequently, to identify all profiles with different BC and CM outcomes, select q T in a particular ranking region and vary the µ value for q = q T + µ(1, 1, 1) so that the associated V CM vertex defines conflicting CM and BC outcomes. (This occurs when q and q T are in different transitive ranking regions, or when q is in a cyclic region.) Thus, in a subtle, crucial manner, the CM depends upon the Condorcet portion of a profile.
Kemeny's rule.
If we ignore pairwise ties, Kemeny's rule (KR) (Kemeny [10] , Saari, Merlin [32] ) for three candidates can be described in the following manner. 7 • When the pairwise rankings define a transitive ranking, that is the KR ranking.
• When the pairwise rankings define a cycle, reverse the ranking of the pair with the smallest difference between the tallies of the candidates. (That is, the ranking with the smallest x X,Y value. If this can be done in more than one way, the KR ranking consists of all possibilities.) So, if q = q T + µ (1, 1, 1) defines a transitive ranking, this is the KR ranking. As we now know, the Condorcet term can force different transitive rankings to be associated with q and q T . Thus, the Condorcet term affects KR outcomes even when q is transitive. This KR dependency becomes more dramatic when q defines a cycle. Here, the KR divides each cyclic region into three equal parts (rather than six as with the BC) with the cyclic axis on the boundary of each part. The boundaries for this region are where some two coordinates, say x A,B and x B,C , agree. Figs. 4, 5 with Thm. 6, we now can identify all profiles where any two specified methods differ.
Comparisons. Combining the geometry depicted by
Theorem 9.
If q = q T + µ (1, 1, 1) is in transitivity plane (so µ = 0 Proof. Only the assertion about the KR winner with a cyclic outcome needs to be justified. Notice that if the profile consists of the cyclic term alone, then each term in the appropriate Condorcet cycle satisfies the described KR selection process; thus all three are in the KR outcome. Now consider the effect of the q T term which we can assume defines the A B C ranking. This q T term changes the tallies according to Eq. 5.3 where the biggest differential in the new tally occurs in the {A, C} election. The conclusion follows. 8 Thus, all differences among these procedures must be attributed to the Condorcet portion. An interpretation of p C is given next.
The Condorcet portion
An analysis of C 3 must explain the cyclic outcomes. I do this by showing that the pairwise vote applied to p C loses the crucial assumption of individual rationality. The argument uses the natural symmetries of voting procedures which, for a pairwise vote, is capture by neutrality; if each voter interchanges the names of the two specified alternatives, the outcome is similarly exchanged. (Using algebraic notation, this is the Z 2 orbit acting on particular alternatives.) Doing this for all pairs on a specific ranking, say A B C, we end up with eight distinct rankings -two are cyclic. This lead to an argument that the natural domain for pairwise voting is where any complete ranking is admitted as long the pairwise rankings are strict. The following are representations of this algebraic structure. 6.1. Geometry. The pairwise vote can be used by any voter capable of ranking each pair of candidates whether the rankings are transitive or cyclic. As it is irrelevant for the procedure whether a voter's rankings are transitive, the transitivity assumption is a profile restriction. Indeed, the pairwise vote for all voters, even cyclic ones, is given by a point in the orthogonal cube where the cyclic vertices now represent unanimity vertices; e.g., profile (1 − λ)(1, 1, −1) + λ(1, 1, 1) requires λ of the voters to have the cyclic A B, B C, C A preferences. Transitivite preferences restrict the orthogonal cube to the representation cube.
To interpret C 3 , notice that its pairwise vote tally defines a direction toward the cyclic vertex (1, 1, 1) . As far as the pairwise vote is concerned, then, the Condorcet portion can be identified as representing the unanimity preferences of irrational voters with the cyclic preferences A B, B C, C A rather than preferences of transitive voters. Indeed, q T + µ (1, 1, 1) admits the interpretation that a fraction (represented by µ) of the voters have irrational, cyclic preferences.
Consequently, the geometry indicates that applying the pairwise vote to the Condorcet portion of a profile has the effect of dropping the assumption of individual rationality. given by
Here, each candidate is in first, second, and last place exactly once, so (along with neutrality and anonymity) it is easy to argue that no candidate has an advantage; in particular, these voters' votes should cancel. This complete tie outcome does occur for all positional methods, but a pairwise vote yields the A B, B C C A cycle.
To explain this cycle, suppose we know only that a voter prefers A C from {A, B, C}. With this limited information, it is impossible to determine whether his full preferences are rational or irrational (because transitivity involves specific sequencing conditions on all three pairwise rankings). Similarly, by ignoring this sequencing data, a procedure discards information about the individual rationality of voters. This occurs with the pairwise vote as it solely concentrates on how voters rank a particular pair when determining that pair's societal ranking. All information about the relative rankings of other pairs -information vital to determine whether preferences are rationalis ignored.
To illustrate, notice that the irrational voters with the cyclic preferences
cannot vote in a w 3 s election. (To use a w 3 s procedure, voters need a transitive ranking (for 0 < s < 1), or at least a top (for s = 0) or a bottom-ranked (for s = 1) candidate, but cyclic voters fail these minimal conditions.) However, because a pairwise vote ignores information about individual rationality, these irrational voters can use the pairwise vote to reach the expected cycle A B, B C, C A with 2 : 1 tallies.
With a sufficiently heterogeneous society, the pairwise vote cannot distinguish whether the profile involves voters with transitive or irrational preferences. Theorem 3 identifies C 3 as the precise heterogeneity needed for this confusion to occur. Indeed, the combination of anonymity 9 and the ignored sequencing information makes it impossible for the pairwise vote to distinguish between the Eq. 6.1 and Eq. 6.2 profiles because the only relevant data is the number of voters with each pairwise ranking, and these numbers agree for both profiles. Consequently, the pairwise vote cannot distinguish between the Condorcet triplet of Eq. 6.1 and all irrational ways voters rank pairs that generate the same tallies.
A computation proves there are four ways to combine the pairs from Eq. 6.1 to define profiles which differ from the Condorcet triplet. Three have two voters with transitive rankings that reverse each other (so, their votes cancel) while the tie is broken by the third with cyclic preferences A B, B C, C A. Thus, the cyclic ranking is a natural conclusion. The final profile is Eq. 6.2 where, again, the cyclic outcome is most reasonable.
Thus by ignoring information about the transitivity of preferences, the pairwise vote cannot distinguish among the Condorcet profile of transitive preferences (where the arguable outcome is a complete tie), and four other profiles involving irrational voters where the cyclic outcome is the "correct" one. The cyclic pairwise outcome merely manifests the pairwise vote's attempt to reflect most ways profiles can be defined to reach this particular arrangement of pairwise tallies. In doing so, it emphasizes the beliefs of potential (but non-existent) irrational voters. Stated in another way, the properties of the pairwise vote are such that when it is applied to C 3 , the assumption that individual preferences are transitive is lost. Thus all non-transitive arrangements of pairwise outcomes -quasi-transitive rankings, acyclic rankings, cyclic rankings, tallies violating additive transitivity (Eq. 4.1) -are due to this C 3 portion of a profile because this is where the pairwise vote loses the assumption of individual rationality.
To see why a Basic profile avoids these difficulties, notice that B A has one voter with A B C and another with A C B causing the {B, C} comparisons to cancel. (The same cancellation holds for the B A rankings associated with negative numbers of voters.) This cancellation accentuates A's role while treating equally all other candidates with a tie vote. Consequently, the pairwise ranking of a general Basic profile a B B A + b B B B + c B B C strictly manifests the ordering properties of the a B , b B , c B coefficients. Rather than reflecting desirable properties of the procedure, the transitivity of the pairwise vote in this setting is preserved by the nature of the Basic profiles.
6.3. Borda-Condorcet comparison. As shown in Sect. 5.2, all differences among the BC, pairwise rankings (even tallies), and the Condorcet winner and loser are due to the p C term; the BC ignores p C while the pairwise vote and Condorcet winner crucially depend upon it. But because the pairwise vote depends on the Condorcet portion of a profile, we now know that whenever there is a difference between the BC and Condorcet rankings, it is due to the Condorcet's partial dismissal of the crucial assumption of the individual rationality of voters. For instance, Sect. 5.2.3 has examples illustrating Condorcet's result that the Condorcet winner need not be top ranked by any positional method. The construction of these examples must rely upon the p C portion, so Condorcet's assertion is due to the pairwise vote ignoring the rationality of voters. Thus, rather than supporting the Condorcet winner, these examples expose a flaw.
It also follows that rather than reflecting poorly on the BC, any difference in Condorcet and BC outcomes demonstrates a BC strength while indicating a serious failing of the Condorcet approach. This, of course, contradicts a general choice theory belief of more than two centuries. The same assertion extends to all differences between the BC and other methods using pairwise rankings. As shown in Sect. 5, the non-BC procedures depend upon the Condorcet portion of a profile. Thus one can argue that the procedure's outcomes are compromised because it involves the partial dismissal of the crucial assumption of the rationality of voters. This charge applies to agendas, the Copeland Method, Kemeny's rule, and many others. In fact, combining the profile decomposition and the interpretation of the Condorcet term leads to the following more general assertion.
Theorem 10. Assume that a voting method M (either a social choice or welfare function) depends upon pairwise tallies and/or rankings. Furthermore, assume that with a Basic profile, the outcome of M is consistent with the Condorcet ranking. If there exists a profile where M disagrees with the BC ranking, then the difference is because M has partially dismissed the assumption of the individual rationality of the voters.
Theorem 10 both extends Arrow's Theorem and explains his important assertion. This is explored next.
6.4. Arrow's Theorem. This discussion directly counters standard beliefs from choice theory. For instance, it is easy to find criticisms arguing that even though the BC has desirable properties, the BC "violates the binary independence axiom · · · it is not rationalizable and violates choice theoretic conditions." (Schofield, p. 12 [35] .) Instead of being a BC fault, the real flaw is that the binary independence condition unintentionally drops the crucial assumption of individual rationality when applied to p C . An easy proof of this assertion is to note that by dropping the Condorcet portion of the profile, the BC satisfies binary independence. (This is immediate from Thm. 3.) More generally, by removing the p C portion of a profile before applying IIA, Arrow's theorem is replaced with a positive assertion. All non-BC positional methods rely upon the reversal portion of a profile, so they cannot satisfy the binary independence conditions even when the Condorcet portion is removed. Therefore, the BC is the only positional method satisfying Thm. 11.
Proof. These procedures satisfy all conditions with the possible exception of binary independence. Without the Condorcet portion, the rankings of these procedures are strictly determined by the Basic portion. The conclusion follows from Thm. 3.
Theorem 11 provides insight into other ways advanced to avoid Arrow's assertion. (See, for example, the papers of Weymark and his coauthors; e.g., [41] .) One approach (Saari [24] ) is to modify the binary independence condition so that the procedure must use transitive preferences; again, we end up with a conclusion similar to Thm. 11. Indeed, many (if not all) extensions or profile restrictions of Arrow's Theorem that avoid a dictator can be viewed as finding ways to minimize or counter the effects of the Condorcet portion of a profile. In other words, as Arrow's impossibility theorem is completely due to the p C portion of a profile, it underscores the importance and utility of the profile decomposition.
6.5. Summary. This analysis compromises arguments advanced to support procedures, such as the Condorcet, Copeland, Kemeny, agendas, and other procedures based on pairwise outcomes; i.e., it is difficult to justify the Condorcet bias manifesting a violation of individual rationality. A natural way to correct this difficulty is to remove the p C portion so that the pairwise vote is determined only by the Basic portion of the profile. This approach, which also changes Arrow's assertion, removes all flaws and faults of the pairwise vote so that procedures regain their merits.
According to Thm. 3, the BC and pairwise outcomes agree on Basic profiles. So, once the source of the flaws of pairwise voting are removed, the virtues identified with any procedure apply to the BC. Thus a pragmatic way to correct the pairwise vote -and all reasonable procedures based on the pairwise vote -is to use the BC. 3.
Positional methods and Reversal terms
Theorem 3 ensures that all ranking and choice difficulties caused by positional methods can be completely analyzed with just the p B and p R portions of a profile. Because all positional methods agree on the Basic portion, all conflict in societal tallies, rankings, and choice must be attributed to the Reversal portion for non-BC positional procedures. Thus all of the perplexing three-candidate difficulties -problems central to choice theory -admit a simple yet complete analysis.
Reversal Symmetry.
A useful way to think of elections is to pair voters with directly opposing opinions. Presumably, the votes from each pair define a tie which is then broken by the preferences of the remaining voters. For instance, if 20 voters prefer A B and 18 prefer B A, then the tie created by the 18 pairs of opposing voters is broken by the last two who prefer A; i.e., with the earlier notation τ (A, B) = 2.
"Neutrality" is where vote tallies change with the candidates' names; e.g., if all voters thought A was B and B was A, then the new outcome assigns the correct name to a tally -now B beats A by 20 to 18. Similarly, if each voter reverses his ranking, we might expect a reversed election outcome. The following definition extends this reversal behavior to any number of candidates. Let ρ(r) be the reversal of ranking r and ρ(p) the profile where each voter's ranking is reversed. While Reversal Symmetry appears to be an innocuous, reasonable condition that should be expected from all election procedures, arguments probably can be designed to identify situations where this is not the case. I take a pragmatic stance by emphasizing the central role played by this condition to explain all positional voting paradoxes and behavior.
To demonstrate this condition, suppose all voters erred by marking their ballots opposite to what was intended. To find the correct outcome, we might follow the lead of the neutrality example by reversing the election outcome. For instance, consider the profile 
; that is, the outcome is a complete tie. Proof. This is a simple computation. 7.2. Symmetry breaking. Theorem 12 captures the mathematical concept of "symmetry breaking." To illustrate, place a plastic stirring stick on a plane along the x-axis and then squeeze the ends inwards. Initially, when the stick remains straight, there is a rotation symmetry; i.e., rotating the plane about the endpoints defines the same configuration. With certain pressure, the stick "breaks" this symmetry by bending either upwards (the y > 0 region) or downwards (the y < 0 region). But rather than being broken, the symmetry is transferred to relate the two bending possibilities; i.e., rotating this plane about the endpoints (or multiplying the y coordinates by −1) converts each "bending" scenario into the other.
To see this symmetry breaking with positional voting, rewrite the Thm. 12 tallies for R A as
The tallies for the two s choices with a fixed | Proof. This is a simple computation using the above. (Both components are in two-dimensional spaces.) The approach developed here describes how p R terms affect the outcome for a specified p B . To do this, plot the p B outcome and then consider all ways the p R term can alter this outcome with various w 3 s methods. As Thm. 3 asserts, this is captured by the procedure line which can be displayed in the representation triangle of (Saari [24] ).
View the equilateral triangle (Fig. 6) as the election tallies normalized to unity; i.e., the set 
Fig. 6. Reversal behavior
The procedure line starts from the plurality outcome of the p B + p R differential, passes through the dot (the BC outcome) and ends half again as far away; this line, which captures all possible w 3 s outcomes, is illustrated by the slanted line in Fig. 6 . (As differentials define directions rather than points, increasing the Reversal term moves the reference Basic point toward the point of complete indifference. Also, the representation triangle distorts relationships among w 3 s rankings as it normalizes the voting vector (w 1 , w 2 , 0) so that w 1 + w 2 = 1 rather than w 1 = 1. See (Saari [24] ) for more details.) Figure 6 shows how to create examples exhibiting a host of different positional method behavior associated with the A B C BC outcome. To change the plurality ranking to B C A, for instance, the dashed arrows require adding R B and R C components to p B . As the positional line passes through the p B (or BC) outcome, the antiplurality outcome must be A B C. Each procedure line represents a profile, so the procedure line in Fig. 6 illustrates a profile where each candidate wins with appropriate w 3 s procedures. As the procedure line is determined by its endpoints (the plurality and antiplurality outcomes), the goal of associating all supporting profiles with a specified outcome is accomplished by determining which (a R , b R ) coefficients of p R = a R R A + b R R B define appropriate endpoint rankings. (Assume that p B = a B B A + b B B B defines the Basic profile ranking A B C.) To do so, notice that the p B + p R plurality tally is
Set components equal and use algebra to determine all (a R , b R ) values defining, say, a A ∼ P B relative plurality indifference outcome. (These profiles cause a plurality ranking change.) The results are in Fig. 7 where the numbers with subscripts P indicate (a R , b R ) regions (see Fig. 1a ) defining associated plurality rankings; the solid lines depict profiles causing plurality indifference between the indicated pairs. Namely, this portion of the figure displays all possible profiles which define all possible plurality outcomes which accompany the specified BC and Basic ranking.
Similarly, by using the antiplurality tally
we obtain the (a R , b R ) values causing all antiplurality outcomes; they are denoted with subscript A and the dashed lines denote antiplurality indifference between the indicated alternatives. To illustrate, notice that a point to the right of the vertical dashed line and between the solid and dashed slanted lines has 1 P and 3 A rankings; i.e., these coefficients identify profiles which define type 1 plurality and type 3 antiplurality outcomes. Proof. For each identified procedures to have a different winner, the procedure line in Fig. 6a must pass through region 1 (for the BC outcome) with endpoints in regions 3 and 6. Similarly, the only other way all candidates can be winners is if the endpoints are in regions 1 and 4 where the procedure line is on the correct side of complete indifference. The stated conditions follow from Fig. 7 . Finally, if all outcomes agree, then the plurality and antiplurality outcomes must have a type 1 ranking. Again, the conditions follow from Fig. 7 .
To use Thm. 14 to construct a profile where A, B, and C are, respectively, the BC, plurality, and antiplurality winners, select a point from the 6 P and 3 A region. With a B = 2, b B = 1, such a point is a R = 3, b R = 5 to define the profile differential (−5, 9, −2, −9, 7, 0). Thus the associated profile (4, 18, 7, 0, 16, 9) has the desired properties.
7.6. Combinations. The profile decomposition is a powerful, easily used tool because the p C and p R portions, respectively, have no effect on the positional and the pairwise rankings. Consequently the effects of these profile portions can be separately considered. Thus, a receipe to create all possible examples is to start with a Basic profile p B ; say, with the A B C outcome. Use Fig. 5 to select a Condorcet coefficient to force the desired admissible pairwise rankings; use Figs. 6 and 7 to select the desired behavior for the positional methods.
To illustrate by designing a profile with the BC outcome A B C, Condorcet and antiplurality winner B, and plurality winner C, the Condorcet choice imposes (Thm. 6) a constraint on a B and b B ; e.g., the a B = Results such as the following now are immediate. capture the conflict between plurality A B ∼ C outcome and the unanimity preference; it is caused because the plurality method fails Reversal Symmetry. While the pairwise outcomes agree with the unanimity ranking, the tallies fail to reflect A's distinct favored status. Compare this with the respective {A, B}, {B, C}, {A, C} Basic pairwise outcomes of ( 8.5. Strategic behavior. To conclude, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts that with more than two alternatives, there exist settings where a non-dictatorial procedure can be manipulated. It is of interest to know when a procedure is, or is not susceptible to strategic behavior. 10 With the plurality vote, for instance, if over half of the voters prefer a particular candidate, then the system is free from successful manipulation. B. Grofman and E. Niou called my attention to a reasonable conjecture that the plurality system remains free from strategic action when the plurality winner also is the Condorcet winner.
This conjecture is false because p R and p C have independent affects on the plurality and pairwise outcomes. To construct counter-examples, add appropriate p R terms to a Basic profile to barely satisfy the plurality ranking condition, and a p C term to make A the Condorcet winner. Add an appropriate Kernel term to have enough voters to create manipulative opportunities. For instance, profile (2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) + 2K has A as the (one-vote) plurality and Condorcet winners. However, the two C B A voters prefer B to A, so voting for B instead of C strategically changes the plurality outcome to B. 
